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Introduction: tackling incivilities in the urban context 
Social incivilities, understood as lower-level breaches of community standards, have received 
ample scholarly attention over the years, although mostly in the Anglo-American context, 
because they appear to signal crime and trouble (LaGrange, Ferraro and Supancic 1992, 
Hunter 1978), just like broken windows or other physical cues do. Activities such as loitering, 
hanging around and displaying improper behaviour, have increasingly become the target of 
policies aimed at reducing fear for crime and insecurities (Garland 2001). This also holds for 
the Netherlands, where the government does not provide an explicit definition, but describes 
social incivilities as “behaviour systematically severely impacting on the wellbeing, and 
which is specifically targeted at specific persons”i. A more useful definition might be the one 
of the European Commission (2000: 4) that defined antisocial conduct as “conduct that 
without being a criminal offence can by its cumulative effect generate a climate of tension and 
insecurity”. Preventing and punishing these categories of behaviour have become crucial in 
times in which the police and other law enforcement agencies are under pressure to prevent 
crime from happening.  
As the types of behaviour that comprise incivilities or anti-social behaviour are open to broad 
interpretation and are framed and criminalised differently across time and space (Peršak 2014: 
13), this approach to security combines the broad interest in incivilities and sub-crime with 
the increased monitoring of ‘suspect populations’ and ‘disorderly spaces’ (Van der Leun and 
Koemans 2013, De Leeuw and Van Swaaningen 2011). The preventive aims of the new crime 
complex are therefore typically accompanied by new technologies and risk assessments 
(Feeley and Simon 1992, Dekkers and Van der Woude 2014). On the other hand, the 
discretionary judgements of police officers get a lot of weight, as the police is expected to 
intervene early and ‘nip crime in the bud’ (Svensson and Saharso 2014). 
 For decades, Dutch politicians supported the strong social character of crime policies and 
felt that (perceived) problems of incivilities, disorder, sub-crime or anti-social behaviour 
should not be dealt with under criminal law (Downes and Van Swaaningen 2007). This 
restraint tied in with the emphasis on regulated tolerance that characterised Dutch society for 
a long time (Buruma 2007, Engbersen, Van der Leun and De Boom 2007). In 1985, a 
governmental committee explicitly advised the Dutch cabinet not to address phenomena such 
as nuisance or disorder in the public domain with criminal law in order to avoid over-
criminalisation and escalation. Now, thirty years later, criminalisation is seen as an important 
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tool in the combat against incivilities. In particular in reaction to the events of 9/11, 
preventive powers of law enforcement have been seriously expanded (see the next section). In 
2007, Den Boer (2007: 17) noted with respect to Dutch policy changes after 2011: “With the 
relatively one-sided choice for repression and selective and proactive investigation, the 
Netherlands seems to have abandoned its traditional culture of trust, familiarity and 
tolerance”. Garland’s influential observations regarding contemporary societies such as the 
US and the UK that came to be cultures of control also appears to be applicable to the 
Netherlands with its rapidly changing crime policies in which tackling sub-crime and 
incivilities has moved to the fore (Van Swaaningen 2005, Daems 2009, Koemans 2010). The 
Dutch government has chosen to expand the traditional criminal law approach to 
misdemeanours (a category of behaviour that is deemed less serious than criminal offences) 
and criminalize social incivilities at the national level. Inspired by British examples, criminal 
law has also been supplemented with new possibilities of punishing behaviour under 
administrative law. Administrative legislation provides local authorities, which have strong 
powers with respect to security and public order, with more legal instruments (often dubbed 
administrative sanctions) to react to and prevent incivilities. In 2010 a law pertaining to severe 
anti-social behaviour, with many similarities to the British Anti-Social Behaviour Order 
(ASBO), was enacted
ii
. This law consists of a civil order backed up by a criminal penalty 
(Koemans 2010). These forms of criminalisation do not imply that social policies have been 
abandoned, though. The Dutch approach to incivilities can best be described as a mix of 
repression and criminalisation on the one hand and social and urban restructuring on the other. 
A longstanding policy tradition under the label of Big Cities Policy (GSB) aims to improve 
disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods by focussing on the economic pillar, the physical 
infrastructure, and the social infrastructure, and the national government has heavily invested 
in doing so for decades now (Van Kempen, 2000).  
 Several authors have concluded that repressive policies aiming at incivilities are primarily 
concerned with governing troublesome youth, in particular when hanging around in public 
spaces (Crawford 2008, Bannister and Kearns 2013). Whereas this selective focus is indeed 
visible in the Netherlands, problems of incivilities and anti-social behaviour in the streets in 
the Netherlands are first and foremost associated with young male citizens with an immigrant 
background in distressed and multi-ethnic neighbourhoods. Notwithstanding the Big Cities 
Policy, this process is comparable to what has been noticed in the United States with respect 
to inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, many of whom have a different ethnic or 
racial background than the dominant groups in society. In many large cities and in particular 
in diverse areas, hanging around in public spaces is reason enough for the police to intervene 
(Collins 2007).  
 The keen interest in people with a migrant background is directly linked to the social 
climate in the Netherlands more in general. Over the last two decades, tensions resulting from 
the persistently weak socioeconomic position of certain (ethnic) groups combined with public 
concern with the feasibility of the prevailing tolerant approach to immigration rose (Pakes 
2004, Engbersen et al. 2007, Van der Leun and Van der Woude 2011). Tensions manifested 
themselves more intensely in specific urban areas than elsewhere in the Netherlands. Many 
diverse urban neighbourhoods contain a relatively high share of low-income families 
including those with an ethnic minority background. The same neighbourhoods are also 
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plagued by relatively high levels of disorder and crime and feelings of insecurity, and highly 
policed. For many Dutch politicians, it has become self-evident that the authorities should not 
only fight employment, restructure housings stock and actively involve citizens in urban 
policies, but also act firm against incivilities and social problems (Pakes 2005, Van Stokkom 
2007, Van Swaaningen 2008). Already in 1995, the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau 
concluded that the mere presence of ethnic minority groups in areas increased feelings of 
insecurity among the traditional neighbourhood residents and gave them the impression that 
the neighbourhood was deteriorating (SCP 1995, Uitermark 2003). Tapping into these 
insecurities, which have been exacerbated over the years by fears of terrorism and cross-
border crimes and the mediatised attention for high crime figures for some groups of 
immigrants, politicians have effectively called for broader powers for law enforcement and 
for a more repressive stance. We could argue that the expressive characteristics of the anti-
incivilities agenda are accompanied by fear for outsiders in that its tools enable the targeting 
of those marginalized groups who (seemingly) exhibit behaviours that are seen as ‘different’ 
(Tonry and Bildsten 2009, Boone and Van Swaaningen 2013).  
 The present chapter will critically look at these development from a crimmigration 
control point of view: to what extent do these broad policing powers and the combat against 
incivilities lead to the selective de facto criminalisation of marginalized young people with a 
migrant background when using public space? And how does that impact upon the 
(perceived) selectivity with regard to people with a migrant background? The underlying aim 
is to turn the attention to a broader lens than the traditional rather narrow one which is 
advocated by human rights organisations, which emphasises police discrimination or 
institutionalised racism and tends to overlook wider societal processes including law making 
and policy drafting. By way of illustration of the dynamics that these policies can bring about, 
it will zoom in (a) on ID checks in the streets based on explorative qualitative fieldwork in six 
neighbourhoods in two large Dutch cities, namely Amsterdam and The Hague, and 
observation of police citizens encounters in these same neighbourhoods in The Hague, and (b) 
on surveillance of irregular migrants. But first, we will depict the legal framework of 
expanding law enforcement powers.  
 
Powers, legitimisations and selectivity  
 
In addition to far-reaching urban renewal programs with a combination of urban restructuring, 
social policies, repression and the introduction of restraining orders after British example 
(Van der Leun and Koemans 2013), a number of fairly recent legislative changes have 
evidently broadened the scope for action for law enforcement officials (Van der Woude and 
Van der Leun 2013). These changes include the introduction of preventive stop and search 
powers as of 2002. Before, law enforcement officials could carry out searches if there was a 
reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense (Art. 27 in relation to  55b of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure). Since 2002, the legal basis for stop and search powers can be found in both the 
Municipalities Act
iii
 (Art. 151b) and the Weapons and Ammunitions Act
iv
 (Art. 50-52). The 
powers to stop and search are vested in mayors by means of a by-law
v
 which they can decide 
on after having consulted the municipal council and the public prosecutor. The mayor can 
designate certain areas as ‘security risk zones’ in which anyone can be subjected to a 
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‘preventive search’ by police officers during a fixed period of twelve hours. Under authority 
of the public prosecutor, the police can search any individual as well as goods and vehicles, 
without having concrete grounds for suspicion (Van der Woude and Van der Leun 2013).  
 Within the context of counterterrorism, police officers can also perform preventive 
searches without a preceding order by the public prosecutor. These searches can take place in 
permanent security areas that are considered at risk. Over the years, these powers have been 
expanded. A crucial body of law enabling these preventive searches is the Dutch 
counterterrorism legislation: in response to the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences (Extension of Powers) Act was 
implemented
vi
 (see also Van der Woude 2010).  
 In addition to these wide stop and search powers in designated areas, police officers and 
other law enforcement officials exercise several broader powers, which relate to concerns 
about irregular migration and residence. Cases in point, which are relevant for the present 
chapter, are immigration controls and identification checks, which have both been expanded 
against the background of concerns about migration. The most recent significant adaption of 
the Aliens legislation, the Netherlands Aliens Act 2000
vii
 , which came into force in 2001, 
includes several renewed provisions (sections 50 and 53) for police and immigration 
authorities to carry out house searches for illegally residing immigrants and also broadened 
the scope for stopping people in the street to ask for their identity and nationality. Police 
officers are the ones who are vested with the surveillance of illegal residence in the 
Netherlands and they can stop people in the streets when there is a reasonable suspicion that 
such persons are unlawfully residing or in order to prevent illegal residence of persons after 
they have crossed the border (section 48). Moreover, the police are authorized to enter a 
dwelling without the consent of the occupant if there is a reasonable suspicion that an alien 
who is not a lawful resident is staying there (section 51). In the adjacent area of illegal and 
undeclared labour, the powers of the Labour Inspectorate have been expanded since 2013 
under the Act on Enforcement of Labour and Social Security Law
viii
 and a new policy was 
introduced to focus more specifically on high risk sectors, which are likely to be sectors with 
high shares of migrant labour (Renooy 2013). These are all laws, regulations and policy 
choices that are based on broad powers, which at least open up the possibility that people with 
a migrant background will run a relatively high risk of being detected when crossing legal 
boundaries in one way or another.  
 Equally relevant for the present chapter is the expansion of the Identification Act
ix
. 
Opportunities for identification checks were vastly expanded with the introduction of the 
2005 Extended Compulsory Identification Act (WUID), which replaced the more limited act 
of 1994 which was officially based on consent (meaning that a person could refuse 
cooperation). Investigating officers and supervisors were given the power to demand proof of 
identity from individuals aged 14 or older as part of the performance of their regular duties 
instead of only under specific instances, as held before. Individuals who do not immediately 
comply with this demand are guilty of a criminal offence as they are violating Section 447e of 
the Dutch Criminal Code
x
 and can incur a fine. Whereas in the past, many Dutch citizens 
strongly opposed identification checks, which were often associated with World War II 
(Böcker 2002, Pakes 2004), these expansions were accepted without significant protests, 
presumably as they were seen as crucial in fostering security. Internal rules emphasise that 
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there have to be circumstances that warrant ID checks and that the police should not check 
identification documents of people of whom they already know who they are (Van Klink and 
Zeegers 2008). It is clear that the police are not allowed to check IDs independently of other 
reasons (Van Kempen 2006). The limit is set by the fact that there has to be a concrete reason 
to ask for a person’s identity; doing so has to be reasonably necessary for enforcing police 
tasks. Like most expanded powers, the Identification Act was expanded in order to reduce a 
vague mixture of crime, irregular migration and terrorism (Beck and Broadhurst 1998). As far 
as it has been evaluated, evidence has shown that compulsory identification was initially 
applied widely. It was mainly used in the case of regularly occurring minor criminal acts that 
had to do with public order. Apart from conducting checks in public transport and with traffic 
incidents, papers were for instance asked when checking on youths loitering and causing a 
nuisance in places where such disturbances were common, checking on vagrants, beggars and 
people who seemed drunk. Contrary to widely expressed fears, no evidence was found of an 
increase in discrimination after the introduction of the new law (Everwijn, Jongebreur and 
Lolkema 2009). It should be noted, however, that this latter conclusion was largely based on 
information from investigating officers, operational staff, supervisory officials and official 
complaints, which raised some doubts about this conclusion (Eijkman and Schuurman 2011). 
In 2010, the National Government provided more specific criteria for when ID checks were 
allowed and not
xi
. 
 Several authors have expressed concerns that these rapidly widened powers with respect 
to legal and policy interventions have transformed the Netherlands into a surveillance society 
without sufficiently monitoring the consequences and without introducing adequate 
counterbalances (Den Boer 2007). These concerns deepen with respect to ethnic minority 
groups (Eijkman and Schuurman 2011). The fear is that when young men with an ethnic 
background different from the majority population are more likely to be stopped by the police 
and asked for their identity documents, the already difficult relationship between police and 
certain ethnic minority groups may worsen (Smith 1997). It is probably not without reasons 
that the debate on selectivity with respect to people with a migrant background started to 
receive more attention in the Dutch context than in earlier times.  
 Ever since the late 1990s the political and social discourse on migration has gradually 
become more excluding and repressive (Pakes 2004, Van der Leun and van der Woude 2011, 
Van der Woude and Van der Leun 2013). Links between crime, security, migration, and 
integration became more widely seen as social problem than before. Immigrants, and 
especially irregular migrants and those who cause trouble in cities by being criminally active 
or causing nuisance, became increasingly targeted (Leerkes, Engbersen and Van der Leun 
2012). Dutch legislative reforms in the field of crime and immigration control, as well as the 
public and political discourse supporting them, fit into a trend often referred to as 
crimmigration (Stumpf  2006, Van der Woude and Van der Leun 2013): the process whereby 
criminal law and immigration law become interlinked (Legomsky 2007, Sklansky 2012, 
Chacón 2012). So far, there have been few reflections on the implications of the expanded 
laws and enforcement powers in both fields together in practice. Below we will zoom in on 
the example of ID checks and surveillance of irregular migrants departing from the 
assumption that both combine elements of crime control and migration control and both will 
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raise the likelihood that people from an ethnic minority background will be stopped by the 
police when being present in public space, as this may be seen as ‘incivility’.  
 
 
ID checks in urban neighbourhoods 
 
Roughly after 2012, the issue of ‘ethnic profiling’ by the police suddenly started to attract 
public and scholarly attention in the Netherlands. Incidents and indications were rapidly 
translated by NGOs, citizens and scholars into a matter of discrimination, without taking into 
account broader trends such as selective policy attention more in general (Mutsaers 2014, 
Landman 2015). As part of a broader study into police perceptions and police-citizens 
relations in urban neighbourhoods, a considerable body of research has attempted to explore 
the complex relationship between the criminal justice system and ethnic minorities. Views 
with respect to selectivity vary considerably and there has been little consensus to date 
between the various studies as conducted in the Netherlands. On the one hand it is clear that 
members of certain ethnic minority groups, particularly those with a Moroccan and an 
Antillean background are disproportionately represented in criminal justice data, which may 
relate to differences in criminal overrepresentation, but also appears to point to biases. On the 
other hand, studies that directly look into street level decision making have resulted in 
diverging outcomes that do not warrant the strong conclusions that are made in public debate. 
We will not try and solve this debate here, but instead focus on police perceptions and police-
citizens relations in urban neighbourhoods with a particular interest in ID checks.  
 As part of a broader project and with the help of master students in criminology we 
conducted 252 street interviews with young adults in the streets of six neighbourhoods in two 
of the Netherlands largest cities: Amsterdam (141) and The Hague (111). We also observed 
police-citizen interactions during ride-alongs with the police in the same neighbourhoods in 
The Hague. In the course of this empirical study our attention was drawn towards the issue of 
ID checks in relation to unwanted behaviour in public spaces, in particular in the accounts of 
young adults in the streets. Below we will first draw on the street interviews. By going into 
the streets and spontaneously and informally approaching young people we aimed at reaching 
a part of the population that is (a) likely to be more than average at risk for being stopped and 
searched by the police because of their routine activities and (b) likely to be under-represented 
in general population surveys. In the following section, we specifically focus on the recurrent 
theme of ID checks, although the study dealt much more broadly with police-citizens relations 
and was also introduced as such to respondents (Van der Leun et al. 2014).  
 
Young people’s views  
 
After some opening questions, respondents were asked if they were approached or stopped by 
the police in the last 12 months prior to the interview. In Amsterdam, less than half of the 
respondents (43 per cent, N=141) were approached and/or stopped, while in The Hague more 
than half of the respondents (54 per cent, N=111) were approached and/or stopped by the 
police. This held more for men than for women and we also found differences across ethnic 
groups. Respondents with an Antillean, Surinamese and Moroccan background were most 
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frequently stopped. Many people reported to have been stopped more than once in a year. 
They mentioned being stopped between two and 30 times a year, and some even said twice a 
week. Many respondents said they had been stopped ‘a couple of times’, ‘quite often’, ‘too 
often’ or ‘too many times to count’. In The Hague, 85 per cent of the respondents who have 
been stopped said they had been stopped more than once in a year’s time.  
 When being asked about the reason of the stops, most people were short or rather vague 
in their answers: ‘Something happened in the neighbourhood and I was stopped for being a 
suspect’. Others gave more detail on traffic-related incidents (speeding, driving through a red 
sign, not wearing a seatbelt, not wearing a helmet on a motorcycle, no lights or broken lights 
on a car, motorcycle or bicycle, and cycling in a pedestrian area) or causing nuisance and 
creating alcohol and/or drugs related incidents in public areas: ‘I was stopped for hanging 
around and smoking weed’. A few others were reporting general checks for weapons, 
preventive stop-and-search, checks of vehicles, and checks for driving licenses.  
 An aspect that stood out in the interviews was the fact that many respondents spoke 
strongly about the fact that they were often asked for their IDs. Several respondents told they 
saw no reason for these checks: ‘I had to give my ID, but I did nothing’, ‘I was standing in the 
street with friends. They came to ask what we were doing. I had to show my ID’. Although 
we cannot draw strong conclusions, as we did not witness these cases on a large scale, these 
stories seemed to indicate that these young adults felt or were heavily policed, or both, and 
that ID checks played a crucial role in these police checks. In an earlier study in another area 
of the country, Svensson and Saharso (2014) found similar results for a younger age group. 
Their survey showed that ethnic minority youths have more often a proactive contact with the 
police and proactive instruments – including ID checks – used against them. Yet, in a more 
refined analysis, the significance of ethnic appearance disappeared when various control 
variables were introduced. This led the authors to conclude that, to a considerable extent, 
outcome inequalities seem to be largely the result of justifiable distinctions, which may be 
made by the police on other grounds. Yet, they also concluded that this does not eliminate the 
concern, as young people with an ethnic minority background feel over-targeted and were in 
practice more often confronted with proactive policing than their counterparts who were 
native to the country.  
 
Police views 
 
Next to interviewing citizens in the streets, we also conducted observations and interviews 
with police officers on the beat during ride-alongs, in which the topic of ID checks also often 
came to the fore. Overall, research assistants engaged in ride-alongs during 17 police shifts (in 
total 153 hours of observations) and informally talked to the officers in charge during and 
after these shifts (cf. Sollund 2005). During the ride-alongs, the research assistants observed 
actions of 31 officers, eight female and 23 male. As they were together with the officers nine 
hours in a row, they were able to build trust. With approval of the police, the ride-alongs were 
held in three different neighbourhoods in The Hague, two of which were multi-ethnic 
neighbourhoods. Observations were described during and after the shifts in research memos, 
which were later analysed. In the present chapter we only focus on the issue of ID checks 
related to incivilities.  
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 The following interaction, described by one of the research assistants during a ride along 
with the police, forms an example of a situation that attracts police attention:  
 
At the moment that we passed a bakery on X-street, a group of youngsters, probably from 
Moroccan descent, yelled at us (‘hey’…) . The police officer turned the car around and drove 
by again. She immediately explained she just wanted to drive by. As soon as we returned, the 
guys slipped into houses or into a porch. One guy ran off. We made another round and passed 
the bakery again, just in time to see the guy running away. After another around we drove by 
for a third time to check on the hangout. And after the guys again went inside, we left the area. 
While driving, one of the officers commented: ‘This is just to let them know that we keep an 
eye on them’. Her colleague added: ‘One of the guys ran away just to lure us into going after 
them. But we are not going to turn this into a cat and mouse game’. 
 
One of the police officers in the situation emphasised that the individuals they checked were 
OK. They saw them as ‘blokes that you can still talk to’. Yet, the officers did feel they had to 
send out a message that they were keeping an eye on them. In the situation above, the officers 
did just ‘show authority’. The next step is often asking for identification documents. Police 
officer: ‘We can play with our competences. To ask for an ID is always a possibility of 
course’. In many conversations in our study police officers described situations in which they 
express authority – either by asking questions or by asking for IDs – as rather innocent. Police 
officer: ‘Often, it is just a game. Me and a guy, we engage in a fake conversation. Just to let 
him know I keep an eye on him. Sometimes they throw eggs at us or spit on the ground before 
us’.  
 Another officer said: ‘I do not know all details by heart. If someone is not able to show an 
ID, we sometimes take them to the police station. It depends. For example: I have a lot of 
issues with a young Moroccan guy and I always take him with me. We are never able to catch 
him and he is always acting in annoying ways. He might be cycling circles around our car, 
just showing very provoking behaviour. So, in order to antagonise, we will take him along [if 
he is not able to show his ID – the author]. It is a cat and mouse game.’ According to the 
interviews with police officers, they usually made sure they checked identity papers only 
when they had a legitimate reason to do so. Circumstances were always taken into account, 
but then again reasons to engage in an ID check were formulated broadly. Checking papers 
takes place for instance in situations in which young people hang around in places that are 
designated risk areas or emergency areas and where dispersal powers apply. In these 
instances, officers are always allowed to ask for documentation. Some respondents in the 
streets with an ethnic minority background, however, commented that this implied that they 
were stopped and fined when standing in front of their own house or business, which 
frustrated them immensely. They saw this as characteristic for the relations in their 
neighbourhood, which they described as a continuing battle between youngsters and the 
police. Some of them deliberately go to places where they are not supposed to hang around in 
order to provoke the police to act. Police officers frequented these places to show their 
presence and authority. When they indeed take action, they are determined to make clear who 
is in charge. They therefore prefer to show up with several officers and cars and bring young 
people to the office without further ado if they do not carry their IDs. They want to make sure 
they ‘win the game’. Whereas many young people feel harassed by the police just for being 
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there, police officers emphasise that they have to uphold norms and prevent disorder. As one 
police officer said: ‘They hang around in the streets, but even if they only talk in these groups 
of four, they cause disorder. The acoustics of the squares in these neighbourhoods also do not 
help. For us as police officers it is difficult to explain to the youngsters that they have to leave 
because of incivilities if they are only talking. Some of them grow more impertinent after 
every check’.  
 Most police officers seemed to regard ID checks as a simple procedure without realising 
what this could mean to those who are checked regularly. Some officers were more critical 
with respect to the frequent ID checks: ‘It is not something we should want, that they are 
checked so often. We have to make clear their behaviour is wrong, but we should not give 
them the impression that they are fined for who they are’. […] ‘The fines are meant to 
contribute to self-reflection, but that does not happen as they do not really understand what 
they are fined for. And there is no way of explaining this to them, as we cannot even have a 
normal conversation with them’. Below we will turn to a second example of a policy, which is 
increasingly becoming a mixture of crime and migration policy: the surveillance of irregular 
migrants.  
 
The surveillance of irregular migrants  
 
In the Netherlands, the police are responsible for the surveillance of irregular migrants. This 
surveillance used to be a matter of immigration policy and administrative law, but has become 
increasingly intertwined with crime control. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s migrants could 
also be ‘illegally residing’, their presence was not perceived as a particularly worrying or 
pressing problem. The leniency at the time was closely related to the demand for low-skilled 
labour in an expanding Dutch economy, which characterised the policy at that time. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the discourse on (irregular) immigration became more restrictive, but in 
reality things changed gradually and incrementally. For instance, it remained fairly easy for 
irregular immigrants to acquire a tax and social security number with which they could be 
formally employed in certain economic sectors. After 1991, certain practices continued to be 
tolerated, but a number of legislative and other measures were taken to combat illegality more 
effectively. Access to the formal labour market was blocked by imposing sanctions on 
employers and by establishing a protective ring of documentary requirements around the 
formal labour market. It became impossible for illegal immigrants to obtain a tax and social 
insurance number (Van der Leun 2003, Broeders and Engbersen 2007). Subsequently, steps 
were taken to systematically exclude irregular immigrants from public services (welfare, 
social security, health care, education and public housing). In 1998, the Benefit Entitlement 
(Residence Status) Act came into force
xii
 (Van der Leun 2003). From then on, only 
immigrants with residence permits could obtain social security and other social rights. The 
Act is also known as the ‘Linking Act’ because immigration service registration files, census 
bureau data, tax identification data, and social security and social assistance data can all be 
cross-checked to verify the validity of a person’s immigration and work status.  
 Linking up crime and migration only happened in more recent years, when the Dutch 
government has stated its intentions to put more emphasis on tracing, arresting, detaining and 
attempting to expel irregular immigrants. A concrete proposal to take the final step and de 
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jure criminalize illegal residence was included in two recent coalition agreements. After years 
of debate, the Dutch government decided in 2012 to make illegal residence in the Netherlands 
a criminal offence. Foreign national adults who reside illegally would then be guilty of a 
crime (misdemeanour) when apprehended in the country. They could be sanctioned with a 
fine of up to 3,800 Euros and could be imprisoned if they failed to pay the fine. In the end this 
‘crimmigration measure’ was rejected.  
 Remarkably, we know very little about the active surveillance of irregular immigrants in 
practice. My own work in the mid-1990s showed that police officers were often reluctant to 
engage in active migration control. They would only intervene in the case of criminal 
activities. After all, frontline police officers are not only supposed to fight illegal residence, 
they also have to secure good community relations (Van der Leun and Van der Woude 2011). 
A more recent empirical work is lacking. In 2011, there was a mediatized case in which bus 
drivers noticed a number of dark-skinned men and women taking the bus from the Bijlmer 
neighbourhood to posh areas outside Amsterdam. They suspected illegal practices and 
contacted the police, who arrested a number of people and praised the bus drivers for helping 
them in their fight against labour exploitation. Later it turned out that the workers were 
expelled on the basis of illegal residence and labour, and the issue of labour exploitation was 
never investigated. The employers were never fined. Much later, the Council of State decided 
that the police had not been authorized to check the passports of the workers, as there was no 
‘reasonable cause’ to suspect that they were residing illegallyxiii. It is difficult to tell whether 
this case concerns a single incident or whether it illustrates a changing attitude towards 
detecting irregular migrants. In our recent study on police decision in The Hague we did not 
have the impression that during regular duties police officers were actively looking for 
irregular immigrants. We might conclude carefully that there are no indications that the police 
have become more active in apprehending migrants just for the sake of being in the country 
illegally. Apprehensions are not particularly high as far as we know (Van der Heijden, Cruyff 
and Van Gils 2011). Several spokespersons of the police also spoke out against 
criminalization of irregular residence and ‘razzias’ (raids). Yet, at the same time, an 
independent evaluation in 2004 of the use of immigration control powers under the renewed 
Aliens Act 2000 showed that these new powers were increasingly being used (Boekhoorn, 
Speller and Kruijssen 2004), and in today’s highly regulated society with all kinds of regular 
identity checks, illegal immigrants always run the risk of being detected for one reason or 
another when they are present in the public space. The only conclusion we can safely draw is 
that there is little insight into the extent to which irregular immigrants are apprehended by the 
police merely because they are present in public space.  
  
Conclusions: the expressive impact of criminalising incivilities  
 
Among the powers of the police that were expanded over the years in order to deal with 
incivilities, crime and migration, the renewed Dutch Aliens Act and the expanded 
Identification Act and their long-term consequences have received little scholarly and societal 
attention. Both types of control are examples taken out of a wide context of proactively 
policing suspect groups and suspect spaces, yet they seem to be telling examples of the 
consequences of the preventive turn in policing and migration control, and of the intertwining 
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of the two. Both carry the risk of being used selectively against people from with an 
immigrant background. This risk was rather easily dismissed in the political debates that 
surrounded the law making process. When the legislation on carrying IDs was changed in 
2005, the Ministry of Justice emphasised in the parliamentary debate that the new law did not 
involve a general obligation to prove one’s identity. When the issue of thresholds for checking 
people’s residence status in public spaces was brought up, the mantra that was always used 
was that there would be ‘no razzias’. In both instances, professional ethics was seen as a 
safeguard against selective implementation. In practice, however, both types of policy seem to 
contribute to an intensive governing of the behaviour of young men with a migrant 
background in public spaces (Van Klink and Zeegers 2008), although our explorative analysis 
seems to suggest that this is fuelled more by worries about immigrant crime than by 
immigration control rationales. At the same time, we should acknowledge that firm empirical 
evidence is missing.  
 Back in 1986, criminologist Fijnaut alluded to potential unintended outcomes of a 
compulsory ID scheme in the Netherlands by commenting that the groups against who the 
police does not have a reasonable suspicion and who have a marginal position in society are 
likely to be those who will become object of massive police surveillance. He referred to 
“foreigners, young people in the squatting movement, and other non-mainstream groups such 
as itinerant groups and inhabitants of old urban neigborhoods” (Böcker 2002: 95, Van Klink 
and Zeegers 2008). Almost three decades later we can conclude that Fijnaut’s worries were 
probably somewhat strongly voiced but not without reason. Whereas police officers often 
view their practices of asking for IDs as routine practices and their interactions with groups of 
young people in the streets as an innocent way of keeping track of what happens and who is 
doing what, young adults with a migrant background increasingly understand their 
experiences as unjustified examples of selective police attention and the expression of 
exclusion and unrestricted state power. This may also intersect with the surveillance of 
irregular migrants, but there is very little insight into the extent of which this is the case in 
practice.  
 In the Dutch debate, selective attention and feelings of being specifically targeted has so 
far primarily been explained as evidence of ethnic profiling, discrimination or misuse of 
competencies by the police, but our study suggests that lens is far too narrow. The process of 
(perceived) selectivity in policing does not develop solely in the streets. The choice of which 
neighbourhoods or even neighbourhood segments the police shall focus on may have a huge 
impact on those living and working in these neighbourhoods, and the same holds for the style 
of policing. And even more generally: the choice of wide discretionary powers and a lack of 
oversight on how these powers are used are important in fuelling tensions between the police 
and migrant communities (Mutsaers 2014). The fact that anti-police riots erupted in the 
summer of 2015 in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood in The Hague shows that trust between 
migrant communities and the police is unstable and volatile. In October 2015, the mayor of 
The Hague Van Aartsen announced an encompassing Diversity Action Plan as developed by 
the police
xiv
. Among many other measures, this included restraint on the side of the police 
with respect to checking identification documents and more emphasis on explaining why 
people are subjected to controls if they are, thereby acknowledging the external effects of 
these checks. This sounds like a good start, but it is crucial that the unintended consequences 
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of official policies are more openly discussed in Dutch society and that we gain better insight 
into the impact of wide police powers on people with a migrant background. It is equally 
important to look beyond perceptions and street-level decision making and to take higher-
level policy choices – including the choice to focus on incivilities – more thoroughly into 
account. After all, police- citizen relations are not only shaped in the streets.  
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